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Duty and Control in Intermediary Copyright Liability:  
An Australian Perspective 
Kylie Pappalardo*
I. Introduction
The question of whether technology intermediaries such as internet service providers 
(ISPs) and website hosts should be liable for acts of copyright infringement by their users 
has been at the forefront of copyright law for the last three decades. Yet despite a number of 
high-profile cases grappling with this question,1 and repeated legislative and policy debates,2 
the law concerning intermediary copyright liability has not developed in a clear and predict-
able way. In Australia, we still do not have a reliable framework for determining if particular 
intermediaries should be liable for the infringement of third-party users, let alone to what 
extent they should be liable. This article considers the liability of so-called “passive” inter-
mediaries, which are those intermediaries – like ISPs – that have not actively helped users to 
infringe copyright but which face liability because they have not acted to stop the infringe-
ment. It argues that principles of negligence under tort law, which consider whether the 
intermediary has a duty to act and whether that duty has been breached, may provide a more 
coherent framework for assessing the copyright liability of passive intermediaries in Aus-
* LLB (Hon. 1) (Queensland University of Technology), LLM (Georgetown University), PhD Candidate, Austra-
lian Catholic University.
1. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., v. Grokster Ltd. 545 U.S. 913 (2005); In Re Aimster Copyright Litiga-
tion, 334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster Inc. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); Roadshow 
Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd [2012] HCA 16; Cooper v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd (2006) 156 FCR 380; Univer-
sal Music Australia v Sharman License Holdings Ltd (2005) 220 ALR 1.
2. See, for example, the discussions surrounding amendments to the Copyright Act 1968 following the Austra-
lia–United States Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA), which included the addition of safe harbors for network 
providers: Matthew Rimmer, Robbery under arms: Copyright law and the Australia-United States Free Trade 
Agreement, first monday (Mar. 6, 2006), http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1316/1236#r4; 
Robert Burrell and Kimberlee Weatherall, Exporting Controversy? Reactions to the Copyright Provisions of the 
U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement: Lessons for U.S. Trade Policy 2 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 259 (2008). See also 
the debates surrounding the proposed Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), detailed in Annemarie Bridy, Copyright 
Policymaking as Procedural Democratic Process: A Discourse-Theoretic Perspective on ACTA, SOPA and PIPA 30 
Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 153 (2012).
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tralia. In particular, the concept of control in tort law is far more robust than that currently 
found in Australian copyright law. This article uses the Australian High Court decision in 
Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Limited [2012] as a case study to examine the creep of tort 
principles into copyright analysis and to demonstrate how the High Court used those prin-
ciples to inform their understanding of an intermediary’s control over the infringing actions 
of its users.
In Australia, intermediary liability is said to arise from the word “authorize” in sec-
tions 36(1) and 101(1) of the Copyright Act 1968, which provide that copyright is infringed 
by a person who does or authorizes the doing of one of the exclusive acts reserved to the 
copyright owner. “Authorize” has been held to mean: “sanction, approve, countenance,”3 
and it is on that definition that Australian intermediary liability doctrine is based. The 
High Court of Australia has recently criticized the fact that “authorize” has been defined 
by reference to its dictionary synonyms, especially since the words “sanction”, “approve” 
and “countenance” have no fixed legal meaning within copyright law.4 “Countenance”, for 
example, has a number of meanings that are not co-extensive with the common understand-
ing of “authorize”.5 Intermediary copyright liability (or authorization liability, as it is known 
in Australia) therefore sits on rocky foundations. The doctrine has not developed in a prin-
cipled manner, resulting in significant ambiguity about the scope of liability for intermediar-
ies in Australia.6
A recent decision of the High Court of Australia has subtly shifted the discourse 
away from these vague definitions in copyright law towards better-established principles in 
tort. In Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Limited [2012] the High Court unanimously held 
that iiNet, Australia’s second largest ISP, was not liable for the acts of its subscribers who 
had communicated copyrighted films to other users over BitTorrent. The Court found that 
iiNet lacked the power to prevent the infringing uploads except by terminating its contrac-
tual relationships with its subscribers (in effect, terminating the subscribers’ internet access). 
Members of the High Court used a notion of control influenced by tort law to hold that a 
power to prevent infringement at an abstract level (by terminating internet access) did not 
amount to effective control over infringing users and so did not give rise to a duty to act to 
3. Univ. of N.S.W. v Moorhouse (1975) 6 ALR 193.
4. iiNet [2012] HCA 16 at [68], [117].
5. The Oxford English Dictionary includes the following definitions of ‘countenance’: (noun) support or ap-
proval; (verb) admit as acceptable or possible. It defines ‘authorize’ as “(verb) give official permission for or 
approval to (an undertaking or agent)”. See also iiNet [2012] HCA 16 at [68] (French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ); 
id at [125] (Gummow and Hayne JJ).
6. See, for example, Rebecca Giblin, The uncertainties, baby: Hidden perils of Australia’s authorization law 20 
Austl. Intell. Prop. J. 148 (2009); Jane Ginsburg and Sam Ricketson, Inducers and Authorisers: A Comparison 
of the US Supreme Court’s Grokster Decision and the Australian Federal Court’s KaZaa Ruling 11 Media & Arts 
L. Rev. 1 (2006).
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prevent the infringements. This was an unusual development, because principles of tort law 
have never featured prominently in Australian copyright discourse.7
This article will critically evaluate the tort law principles relied upon by members 
of the High Court in the iiNet case. The article addresses, primarily, the issue of liability for 
omissions to act, and argues that in tort law there is a strong onus on the plaintiff to show 
that the defendant had a duty to act. Whether a duty exists will often depend on whether 
the defendant was able to exercise effective control over the actions of the wrongdoing 
third-party. The ability to hinder the third party in some way is not enough to establish a 
duty to act in the absence of effective control. This article argues that an inquiry grounded 
in control as defined in tort law would provide a more principled framework for assessing 
the liability of passive intermediaries in copyright. In particular, it would set a higher, more 
stable benchmark for determining the copyright liability of passive intermediaries, based on 
the degree of real and actual control that the intermediary can exercise over the infringing 
actions of its users. This approach would provide greater clarity and consistency than has 
existed to date in this area of copyright law. 
II. The law (in brief)
In the United States, intermediary copyright liability developed from common law 
principles originating in tort. Intermediary liability for copyright infringement has tradition-
ally been grounded in legal concepts of vicarious liability, which has its origin in agency,8 
and contributory infringement, which is based upon principles of joint tortfeasorship.9 By 
contrast, authorization liability in Australia derives from statute, as interpreted by the courts. 
In fact, courts have traditionally denied the relevance of common law tort principles, stat-
ing that authorization liability in Australia is distinct from liability for the acts of agents or 
employees and liability as a joint tortfeasor.10
In Australia, intermediary liability is said to arise from the word “authorize” in sec-
tions 36(1) and 101(1) of the Copyright Act 1968, which provide that copyright “is infringed 
by a person who, not being the owner of copyright, and without the licence of the owner of 
the copyright, does in Australia, or authorizes the doing in Australia of, any act comprised 
in the copyright.”11 “Authorize” was defined in the leading case of University of New South 
7. See discussion associated with footnote 10.
8. The respondeat superior doctrine in agency law holds that a principal may, in certain circumstances, be liable 
for the acts of his or her agent.
9. Julie E. Cohen, Lydia Pallas Loren, Ruth L. Okediji, and Maureen A. O’Rourke, Copyright in a Global 
Information Economy, 3rd Edition, 476 (Aspen Publishers, 2010).
10. WEA International Inc. v Hanimex Corporation Ltd. (1985) 77 ALR 456; see further Ash v Hutchinson & Co 
(Publishers) [1936] Ch. 489.
11. The US Copyright Act 1976 also gives a copyright owner exclusive rights “to do and to authorize” certain 
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Wales v Moorhouse (1975) to mean: “sanction, approve, countenance.”12 The Moorhouse 
case was brought as a test case to ascertain whether the University of New South Wales 
would be liable for making photocopy machines available in its library (where people could 
take books off the shelves and photocopy them from a small fee) without supervision or dis-
play of proper copyright notices. A majority of the High Court found the University liable. 
The most influential judgment was that of Justice Gibbs, who stated:
It seems to me . . . that a person who has under his control the means by which 
an infringement of copyright may be committed – such as a photocopying 
machine – and who makes it available to other persons, knowing, or having 
reason to suspect, that it is likely to be used for the purpose of committing an 
infringement, and omitting to take reasonable steps to limit its use to legiti-
mate purposes, would authorize any infringement that resulted from its use.13
This statement is widely considered to be the model for sections 36(1A) and 
101(1A), which were inserted into the Copyright Act 1968 in 2000.14 They provide that in 
determining whether a person has authorized infringement, the court must take into account: 
(a) the extent (if any) of the person’s power to prevent the doing of the act 
concerned; 
(b) the nature of any relationship existing between the person and the person 
who did the act concerned; 
(c) whether the person took any other reasonable steps to prevent or avoid 
the doing of the act, including whether the person complied with any relevant 
industry codes of practice.
acts: 17 USC § 106. Most debates in the US have focused on whether the words “to authorize” provide an inde-
pendent right that can be directly infringed, or whether they merely refer to liability for contributory infringe-
ment. The prevailing position seems to be that the language “to authorize” provides “a statutory foundation for 
secondary liability”: Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1221 (D. Minn. 2008). See also Ven-
egas-Hernandez v. ACEMLA, 424 F. 3d 50, 58 (1st Cir. 2005); Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co., 
24 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc); H.R. Rep. 94-1476 at 61 (1976) (“Use of the phrase ‘to authorize’ 
is intended to avoid any questions as to the liability of contributory infringers”); Melville B. Nimmer & David 
Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 12.04 [A][3][a] at 12-85-88; cf. Phanesh Koneru, The Right “To Authorize” 
in U.S. Copyright Law: Questions of Contributory Infringement and Extraterritoriality, 37 IDEA 87 (1996).
12. Univ.of N.S.W. v  Moorhouse (1975) 6 ALR 193.
13. Id. at 200-201.
14. See Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Bill 1999 (Cth), [54]-[56], [122]-
[124]; Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd [2012] HCA 16 at [22], [52] (French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ); id. at 
[133] (Gummow and Hayne JJ).
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The power to prevent infringement, which loosely correlates to control, is the first 
factor to which judges must turn their minds. It is therefore an important feature of the 
authorization doctrine in Australia. In Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Limited [2012], the 
High Court departed from established authority to examine this factor with reference to tort 
law. Two judges expressly referenced principles derived from tort cases in ascertaining the 
meaning of control where passive intermediaries have failed to act to stop infringement. The 
remaining three judges, while not referring to tort principles directly, read down the power 
to prevent factor in a way that accords with a tort-influenced approach. Part III describes, in 
brief, the facts of this case and the tort law references made by the court.
III. Roadshow Films v iiNet
iiNet, Australia’s second largest ISP, provides general internet access to subscribers 
under the terms of its Customer Relationship Agreement. The agreement states, in clause 4, 
that the subscriber must comply with all laws in using the internet service, and must not use 
or attempt to use the service to infringe another person’s rights. It further provides, in clause 
14, that iiNet may, without liability, immediately cancel, suspend or restrict the supply of 
the service if the subscriber breaches clause 4 or otherwise misuses the service.
In August 2007, the Australian Federation Against Copyright Theft (AFACT),15 a 
body which represents the interests of copyright owners and exclusive licensees in films and 
TV programs in Australia, hired DtecNet Software, a software company, to gather evidence 
of apparent copyright infringement by Australian internet users. From July 2008 to August 
2009, AFACT sent notices (“the AFACT notices”) to iiNet on a weekly basis, alleging that 
iiNet subscribers (identified by IP addresses) were downloading and sharing movies via Bit-
Torrent. In response, iiNet raised two issues: it could not understand AFACT’s data, and that 
an IP address was insufficient to identify a particular internet user. iiNet stated that AFACT 
should refer its allegations to the appropriate authorities. iiNet did not suspend or terminate 
any subscriber account under the terms of its Customer Relationship Agreement in response 
to the AFACT notices, nor did it send warning notices to its subscribers.16
The case against iiNet was brought by an alliance of movie studios and media 
companies, including Village Roadshow, Universal Pictures, Paramount Pictures, Warner 
Brothers Entertainment, Sony Pictures Entertainment, Twentieth Century Fox and Disney. 
The movie companies argued that by doing nothing in response to the AFACT notices, 
particularly by failing to enforce the terms of its Customer Relationship Agreement, iiNet 
had at least ‘countenanced’ the infringements. Therefore, by failing to take reasonable steps 
to prevent subscribers from downloading and sharing infringing copies of films, iiNet had 
15. Now called the Australian Screen Association: http://www.screenassociation.com.au/. 
16. Description of facts derived from Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd [2012] HCA 16 at [28]-[35].
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authorized the infringing acts of its subscribers. 
The case came to the High Court on appeal from the Full Court of the Federal Court 
of Australia. The High Court was unanimous in finding that iiNet had not authorized the 
infringements. The High Court delivered two separate judgments. The first, a joint judgment 
by Chief Justice French and Justices Crennan and Kiefel, focused on the statutory language 
in s 101(1A) of the Copyright Act 1968 to find that iiNet’s power to prevent was limited: “It 
had no direct power to prevent the primary infringements and could only ensure that result 
indirectly by terminating the contractual relationship it had with its customers.”17 Addition-
ally, the judges noted the inadequacy of the information in the AFACT notices, holding 
that the notices did not provide enough evidence to compel iiNet to act.18 However, it is the 
second joint judgment by Justices Gummow and Hayne that is of greater interest for the 
purposes of this article. Their Honors drew principles from tort law in finding that iiNet did 
not have a duty to act to stop subscribers from infringing copyright owners’ rights. This is 
an interesting development, given that Australian courts have seldom relied on tort law in 
framing authorization liability.
In their reasons, Justices Gummow and Hayne described the appellants’ case by 
reference to the elements of negligence in tort:
[C]ounsel for the appellants appeared to accept that their case posited a duty 
upon iiNet to take steps so as not to facilitate the primary infringements and 
that this duty was broken because, in particular, iiNet did nothing in that re-
gard.
So expressed, the appellants’ case resembles one cast as a duty of care owed 
to them by iiNet, which has been broken by inactivity, causing damage to the 
appellants.19
Indeed, the appellants had placed significant weight on s. 101(1A)(c) of the Copy-
right Act 1968 in arguing that because iiNet had not taken any reasonable steps to “prevent 
the continuation of the [infringing] acts” it had exhibited indifference about the infringe-
ments.20 They asserted that indifference in the face of knowledge or suspicion of copyright 
infringement amounted to countenancing infringement. The appellants therefore argued that 
even though iiNet had not taken any steps to facilitate infringement, it should nonetheless 
be held liable because it had not acted to stop the infringement. They stated:
17. iiNet [2012] HCA 16 at [69]-[70] (French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ).
18. Id. at [74]-[75], [78]
19. Id. at [114]-[115] (Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
20. Appellants’ Submission in Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd, No S 288 of 2011, 9 September 2011, 3 [13].
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At the least, such conduct amounted to countenancing the infringements of 
copyright for the purposes of authorization. Despite its denials of authoriza-
tion, iiNet permitted the users of its internet service to infringe without inter-
ruption or consequence. It did so because it did not believe that it was required 
to act, because “it had no legal obligation to act”.21
The question of whether or not iiNet did have an obligation or duty to act was at the 
core of Justices Gummow and Hayne’s legal analysis. Their Honors referenced several tort 
law principles in examining the circumstances in which a duty to act to protect another will 
arise. First, they quoted the following passage from a 1914 article on the tort liability of 
public authorities:
The cases in which men are liable in tort for pure omissions are in truth rare…
The common law of tort deals with causes which look backwards to some act 
of a defendant more or less proximate to the actual damage, and looks askance 
at the suggestion of a liability based not upon such a causing of injury but 
merely upon the omission to do something which would have prevented the 
mischief.22
Next, their Honors looked to the separate judgments of Chief Justice Gleeson, Jus-
tice Gaudron, Justice Hayne and Justice Callinan in Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty 
Ltd v Anzil (2000), a personal injury case.23 They stated that these judgments were “recent 
affirmations of the general rule of the common law that in the absence of a special relation-
ship one person has no duty to control another person to prevent the doing of damage to a 
third.”24
Justices Gummow and Hayne dismissed the appeal, finding for iiNet. They held 
that only in a very attenuated sense did iiNet have the ability to ‘control’ the primary in-
fringements, and that for this reason, iiNet could not be liable for failing to act to stop the 
infringements.25 Their Honors concluded: “The progression urged by the appellants from 
the evidence, to ‘indifference’, to ‘countenancing’, and so to ‘authorisation’, is too long a 
21. Id. at 19 [72].
22. Harrison Moore, Misfeasance and Non-feasance in the Liability of Public Authorities 30 L.Q. Rev. 276, 278 
(1914), quoted by Gummow and Hayne JJ in Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd [2012] HCA 16 at [108]. This 
passage had also been cited by the High Court previously, in Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 
512 at 551.
23. Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Anzil (2000) 205 CLR 254, 264 (Gleeson CJ); id. at 270 (Gaud-
ron J); id. at 292 (Hayne J); id. at 299-300 (Callinan J).
24. iiNet [2012] HCA 16 at [109] (Gummow and Hayne JJ).
25. Id. at [146] (Gummow and Hayne JJ).
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march.”26
IV. Tort liability for omissions to act
The principle relied upon by Justices Gummow and Hayne that it is rare, in tort, to 
find liability for pure omissions, has existing High Court authority. In Modbury Triangle 
Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Anzil (2000), Chief Justice Gleeson said, “[T]he general rule that 
there is no duty to prevent a third party from harming another is based in part upon a more 
fundamental principle, which is that the common law does not ordinarily impose liability 
for omissions.”27
For the law to impose liability for an omission to act, there must first be a duty to 
act.28 The alleged duty should be specific and clearly articulated.29 In Roadshow Films v 
iiNet, the appellants claimed that iiNet had a duty to do something to prevent the infringe-
ments, but they did not state to the satisfaction of the High Court what this something was 
or ought to be. This created a problem in determining the scope of the apparent duty that 
iiNet owed to the appellants. A similar problem arose in the Modbury Triangle case. There, 
the respondent worked in a video store in a shopping center owned by the appellant. The 
shopping center had a large outdoor car park, in which the respondent had parked his car. 
The car park was lit until 10pm. On the night in question, the respondent had closed and 
exited the video store around 10:15pm. He walked to his car in the dark, and was assaulted 
and badly injured by three unknown men. The respondent sued the appellant in tort for dam-
ages for personal injury, arguing that the appellant should have acted to protect employees 
by keeping the car park lights on at least until the last employee had left for the evening. A 
majority of the High Court found that this did not properly define the scope of the purported 
duty. It was relevant that the shopping center had ATMs which were accessible by members 
of the public all night. Chief Justice Gleeson stated, “If the appellant had a duty to prevent 
criminal harm to people in the position of the first respondent, at the least it would have had 
to leave the lights on all night; and its responsibilities would have extended beyond that.”30 
Justice Callinan said:
The respondents initially put their submission on the first issue in very broad 
terms indeed. They said that the scope of the duty of care owed by a land-
26. Id. at [143].
27. Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty. Ltd. v Anzil (2000) 205 CLR 254, 265 (Gleeson CJ) .
28. “[I]t is not negligent to abstain from doing a thing unless there is some duty to do it.” Sheppard v Glossop 
Corp [1921] 3 KB 132, 145 (Scrutton LJ), quoted in Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512, 621 
(Hayne J).
29. See Harrison Moore, Misfeasance and Non-feasance in the Liability of Public Authorities 30 L.Q. Rev. 276, 
280 (1914).
30. Modbury 205 CLR 254, 266-267 (Gleeson CJ).
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lord in control of commercial premises to employees of its tenants is to mini-
mize the risk of injury to them by criminal acts of third parties, wherever it is 
reasonably foreseeable that criminal conduct may take place, and the cost of 
minimizing or eliminating that risk is reasonable.
The submission goes beyond any formulation of the duty to be found in any of 
the decided cases of this country.31
Justice Hayne, similarly, thought that the duty alleged by the respondent was not a 
duty to light the car park. “The failure to light the car park was no more than the particular 
step which the respondents alleged that reasonable care required the appellant to take.”32 
Justice Hayne emphasized the difference between a duty and reasonable steps taken in 
furtherance of a duty. This is a distinction that also applies in the context of authorization 
liability – It is the difference between “power to prevent” under s. 101(1A)(a) of the Copy-
right Act 1968 and “reasonable steps [taken] to prevent or avoid [infringement]” under s. 
101(1A)(c). 
In the iiNet case, while the appellants declined to specify what exactly iiNet would 
be required to do to avoid authorizing infringement, they indicated that, at the very least, 
iiNet should have sent warning notices to the subscribers identified by AFACT as infring-
ing copyright. This is akin to the Modbury Triangle respondents arguing that the appellant 
should have prevented the criminal assault at least by leaving the lights on. Like leaving the 
lights on, sending a warning notice might constitute a step taken in furtherance of a duty, 
but it is not the duty itself.
V. The essential element: control
In the iiNet case, the primary acts of infringement were committed by third parties 
whose only relationship to iiNet was a contractual one to acquire internet access. It was not 
alleged that iiNet helped these third parties to infringe copyright by providing them with 
the software used to share the digital files or by telling them how to copy and share digital 
files.33 iiNet had no connection with or control over the BitTorrent protocol used by the in-
fringing subscribers. Rather, the claim was that iiNet had the power to prevent the infringe-
ments under s. 101(1A)(a) but did nothing to stop them. A traditional copyright assessment 
would look to iiNet’s contractual power to terminate or suspend infringing subscribers’ ac-
counts under the terms of the Customer Relationship Agreement. This, arguably, constitutes 
a power to prevent the infringements under s. 101(1A)(a). The copyright-based approach 
31. Id. at 296-297 (Callinan J.)
32. Id. at 291-292 (Hayne J.)
33. Cf. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); Universal Music Australia Pty 
Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd. (2005) 220 ALR 1. 
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is not particularly nuanced, and provides no means of distinguishing between a technical 
power to prevent infringement of the kind arguable in the iiNet case and the existence of 
real and actual control over the infringing acts. The concept of actual control has been more 
thoroughly explored in tort authorities.
Control was a central feature of the tort law cases referred to by Justices Gummow 
and Hayne in their reasons. In Brodie v Singleton Shire Council, a case dealing with the 
liability of highway authorities, the court focused on whether the highway authority had 
control “over the source of the risk of harm to those who suffer injury.”34 In that case, the 
source of the risk was a faulty bridge that had not been repaired. The court ultimately found 
that the highway authority did have sufficient physical control over the bridge in question, 
and so was liable for the plaintiff’s injuries that had occurred when the bridge collapsed. 
Justices Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow stated, “[T]he factor of control is of fundamental 
importance.”35
In Modbury, the court emphasized that the defendant must have some (real) control 
over the actions of the third party who caused the harm before liability will follow. Chief 
Justice Gleeson stated that the appellant in that case “had no control over the behaviour of 
the men who attacked the first respondent, and no knowledge or forewarning of what they 
planned to do.”36 Justice Hayne noted that the appellant’s ability to control the lighting of 
the car park was central to the respondent’s case. However, this misconstrued the issue of 
control, which was really about whether the appellant could control the men who assaulted 
the respondent. Justice Hayne found that the duty asserted by the respondent was a duty “to 
take reasonable steps to hinder or prevent criminal conduct of third persons which would 
injure persons lawfully on the appellant’s premises.”37 He held that this amounted to a duty 
to take steps to affect the conduct of persons over whom the appellant had no control. He 
concluded, “No such duty has been or should be recognized.”38 
Justice Hayne in Modbury highlighted that the ability to control and the ability to 
hinder are two different things and should not be confused. To hold the appellant liable for 
failing to take small steps which might have reasonably hindered the offending behaviour 
would cast the net of tort liability too wide, by holding the appellant responsible for con-
duct it could not control and where its contribution to the harm was negligible.39 Justice 
34. Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512, 558-559 (Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ).
35. Id.
36. Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Anzil (2000) 205 CLR 254, 263 (Gleeson CJ).
37. Id. at 291-292 (Hayne J).
38. Id. Justice Gaudron, in her reasons, agreed particularly with Justice Hayne emphasis on “the significance of 
control over third parties before the law imposes a duty of care to prevent foreseeable damage from their ac-
tions,” id. at 270.
39. Id. at 293 (Hayne J).
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Hayne emphasized that the coherence of tort law depends upon “the notions of deterrence 
and individual responsibility.”40 To hold the appellant liable in circumstances where it had 
not contributed to the wrong would do nothing to further the goal of promoting individual 
responsibility for one’s actions.
Chief Justice Gleeson made a similar point in his reasons. He said, “The respondents 
submitted that the appellant assumed responsibility for the illumination of the car park. That 
submission confuses two different meanings of responsibility: capacity and obligation.”41 In 
other words, while the appellant owned the car park and decided when to turn the car park 
lights on and off (capacity), that did not mean that the appellant assumed an obligation to 
care for the security of people in the car park by keeping the lights on to protect them from 
attack by third parties.
The principle relied upon in both Modbury and iiNet, that there is no general duty to 
control a person to prevent them doing harm to another, is derived from a statement made 
by Justice Dixon in the 1945 case of Smith v Leurs. There, Justice Dixon said: 
It is, however, exceptional to find in the law a duty to control another’s actions 
to prevent harm to strangers. The general rule is that one man is under no duty 
of controlling another man to prevent his doing of damage to a third.42 
Smith v Leurs was a personal injury case in which a 13-year-old boy (Leurs) had 
used his toy slingshot to fire a stone at another boy (Smith), hitting him in the eye and seri-
ously damaging his sight. Smith sued Leurs’s parents in negligence, for allowing Leurs to 
play with the slingshot and for failing to control him in his use of the slingshot. There was 
evidence that Leurs’s parents had warned their son of the dangers of playing with a sling-
shot and had forbidden him to use it outside the limits of their home. The court found that 
this order was a genuine one and reasonable in the circumstances. There was no evidence 
that the parents could have expected Leurs to disobey them by taking the slingshot outside 
his home to play with other boys.43 As in Modbury Triangle, the court distinguished between 
capacity and obligation. Although the parents certainly had the capacity to deny Leurs the 
possession of a slingshot, the court held this this was not a reasonable expectation. Chief 
Justice Latham noted that a slingshot “is a common object in boyhood life. Annoyance 
rather an actual physical harm is the worst that is normally to be expected from its use.”44
40. Id. On this point, Justice Hayne cites Jane Stapleton, Duty of Care: Peripheral parties and alternative oppor-
tunities for deterrence 111 L.Q. Rev. 301, 317 (1995). See also, Peter Cane, The Anatomy of Tort Law (Oxford 
Press: 1997) 3, 25.
41. Modbury (2000) 205 CLR 254, 264 (Gleeson CJ).
42. Smith v Leurs (1945) 70 CLR 256, 261-262 (Dixon J).
43. Id. at 259 (Latham CJ); id. at 265 (McTiernan J).
44. Id. at 259.
IP THEORY Volume 4:  Issue 1 19
Both Smith v Leurs and Modbury Triangle raise interesting points for consideration 
in the iiNet case. Did iiNet have real control over the actions of its infringing subscribers? 
iiNet had contracts with its subscribers that gave it the capacity to terminate subscriber ac-
counts for breaches of the law. Additionally, the iiNet contracts warned subscribers against 
infringing copyright.45 There was some debate as to whether this warning was a genuine one 
– the appellants argued that unless iiNet was willing to impose measures to deter or prevent 
infringement, then the warning was a toothless tiger; iiNet countered that it would be will-
ing to take steps if directed by a court order, but it would not act as judge, jury and police on 
the matter.46 Ultimately, the court held that in this case, capacity to terminate did not amount 
to obligation to terminate. The relevant factors were that iiNet’s control over its subscribers 
was indirect at best and its control over use of the BitTorrent protocol was non-existent,47 
and that there was a risk of liability for wrongful termination of subscriber contracts.48
A lingering issue is the distinction between control and the ability to hinder, and the 
point at which failure to act to hinder can attract liability. In iiNet, the appellants argued 
strongly that iiNet should have acted within its capacity to impede infringement, at the very 
least by sending warning notices to subscribers. As a finding of fact, Chief Justice French 
and Justices Crennan and Kiefel held, “[t]he information contained in the AFACT notices, 
as and when they were served, did not provide iiNet with a reasonable basis for sending 
warning notices to individual customers containing threats to suspend or terminate those 
customers’ accounts.”49 The AFACT notices had failed to specify how the information con-
tained in them had been gathered, and so the court found it reasonable that iiNet had con-
sidered the notices to be unreliable.50 This leaves open the possibility that had the AFACT 
notices been more detailed or more transparently evidence-based, iiNet may have been com-
pelled to act on them. It remains, unclear, however, what exactly iiNet would be expected to 
do. It is arguable that even if the AFACT notices had been more substantial, iiNet would not 
have been authorizing infringement by failing to pass them on. All judges of the High Court 
were extremely critical of the appellant’s reliance on the “countenance” aspect of the Moor-
house definition of authorization (“sanction, approve, countenance”).51 It seems likely that 
the action (or inaction) of an ISP would need to rise to the level of at least “sanctioning” or 
“approving” infringement before liability would follow, though what exactly that involves is 
45. See Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd [2012] HCA 16 at [27] (French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ (quoting 
from iiNet’s Customer Relationship Agreement, clauses 4.1, 4.2, 14.2, 14.3)); see also id. at [37], [66]-[67].
46. Id. at [36] (French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ); id. at [96] (Gummow and Hayne JJ).
47. Id. at [69]-[70], [73], [77]-[78] (French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ); id. at [112], [146] (Gummow and Hayne 
JJ).
48. Id. at [75]-[76] (French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ).
49. Id. at [78].
50. Id. at [34].
51. Id. at [67]-[68]; id. at [125] (Gummow and Hayne JJ).
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unsettled.
In determining whether iiNet had taken reasonable steps to prevent the infringe-
ments, Chief Justice French and Justices Crennan and Kiefel also placed some emphasis on 
the wording of s. 101(1A)(c), which includes consideration of “whether the person com-
plied with any relevant industry codes of practice.” Their Honors noted “the absence of any 
industry code of practice adhered to by all ISPs.”52 This suggests that had iiNet been a party 
to an industry code, their Honors may have read s. 101(1A)(c) to create a duty to adhere to 
that industry code. Failure to do so might therefore constitute a breach of that duty and pro-
vide strong evidence that iiNet failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the infringements, 
thereby giving rise to legal liability for authorization.53
Justices Gummow and Hayne were more definitive in their conclusion on warn-
ing notices. They held that the failure to pass on warning notices did not go to the heart of 
the matter; warning might or might not have had the effect of forestalling further infringe-
ments.54 iiNet did not have control over how users behaved and there was no evidence as 
to how users were likely to behave in response to warning notices. “In truth, the only in-
disputably practical course of action would be an exercise of contractual power to switch 
off and terminate further activity on suspect accounts. But this would not merely avoid 
further infringement; it would deny to the iiNet customers non-infringing uses of the iiNet 
facilities.”55 Their Honors’ exercise in distinguishing the small act of passing on warning 
notices from the broader apparent duty of (contractually) controlling users to prevent in-
fringement is similar to the distinction that Justice Hayne drew in Modbury Triangle be-
tween the act of leaving the car park light on and the broader purported duty of preventing 
harm caused by third parties outside the occupant’s control. Ultimately, the core consider-
ation is not what small acts iiNet could have done to hinder infringement, but whether iiNet 
had a specific duty to act in this way.56 
52. Id. at [71] (French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ); see also Gummow and Hayne JJ id. at [139].
53. Although it should be noted that commentators have argued that industry codes requiring ISPs to pass 
on warning notices and take other measures (including terminating user accounts) are unlikely to be formed 
post-iiNet, given the strong position that ISPs now find themselves in: see, e.g., David Lindsay, ISP Liability for 
End-User Copyright Infringements: The High Court Decision in Roadshow Films v iiNet 62(4) Telecomm J. of 
Aust. 53.1, 53.18 (2012).
54. Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd [2012] HCA 16 at [138] (Gummow and Hayne JJ).
55. Id. at [139].
56. This is a point that Justice Hayne made clear in oral arguments (addressing counsel for the appellants): 
“You cannot take these matters to account in determining whether there is authorisation without first having 
your concept of what constitutes authorisation. Now, the arguments you have been presently advancing seek to 
begin with questions of reasonable steps, fasten upon the fact that there is no response to your notice, but then 
seem, if I may say so, Mr. Bannon, to slide imperceptibly by the word “therefore” to the conclusion that there is 
authorization.” Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd [2011] HCATrans 323 (30 November 2011).
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VI. Control in tort and control in copyright – same or different?
Control has long been a central feature of authorisation liability in Australia. It was 
central to the findings in University of New South Wales v Moorhouse, and the accepted 
understanding of s. 101(1A)(a) of the Copyright Act 1968, which directs a court to consider 
a person’s “power to prevent” the infringement, is that it deals primarily with control. It is 
reasonable to inquire, then, as to why Justices Gummow and Hayne saw fit to consider the 
principle of control in tort law when applying the authorisation doctrine in Roadshow Films 
v iiNet, particularly when Australian courts have traditionally rejected the relevance of tort 
law to intermediary copyright liability. If copyright has its own conception of control, sepa-
rate to that in tort, is it really helpful to resort to tort law principles?
Tort law principles help in this area because tort’s notion of control is more rigor-
ous than that currently found in copyright law. Power to prevent in the Copyright Act 1968, 
for example, speaks to capacity, not obligation. It says nothing about what an intermediary 
ought to do. Tort law’s concept of control, on the other hand, is influenced by notions of de-
terrence and individual responsibility, which ask firstly whether a person has acted wrong-
fully in his or her exercise of control and secondly what the wider ramifications of impos-
ing liability will be. Is it proper that the person be held liable? How will that person (and 
persons in similar situations) alter their behavior in response to liability, and is that desirable 
for the fluid functioning of society? These are public policy question that copyright law 
provides little scope to ask.57
Further, copyright law tends to confuse power to prevent under s. 101(1A)(a) with 
reasonable steps under s. 101(1A)(c). If causation is not properly addressed,58 then some 
reasonable steps may mistakenly be held to affect power to prevent. For example, send-
ing warning notices to internet users might be perceived to have some impact on levels of 
infringement, so an intermediary might be held liable for authorization for failing to warn, 
notwithstanding that this is not a real power to prevent. On one view, iiNet came close to 
being held liable for this very thing – had there been an industry protocol in place or had the 
57. These questions are sometimes raised in intermediary copyright liability cases, but analysis tends to fall into 
what Julie Cohen calls the liberty/efficiency binary - either arguments favor finding intermediaries liable to the 
full extent that they are able to prevent infringement in some way, because this would be economically effi-
cient, or they disfavor finding liability on the grounds that technology intermediaries need extensive freedom 
to operate and innovate. See Julie E. Cohen, Configuring the Networked Citizen, in Imagining New Legali-
ties: privacy and its possibilities in the 21st century (Austin Sarat, Lawrence Douglas & Martha Merrill 
Umphey, eds., Stanford University Press 2012)(available for download at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.
edu/facpub/803/). A tort law analysis may provide a more careful way to interrogate these concerns without 
automatically favoring copyright holders or intermediaries. Importantly, it may provide scope to consider the 
interests of internet users within the authorization doctrine.
58. See further Part VII.A. below.
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AFACT notices been more comprehensive, it is possible that some judges may have been 
willing to hold iiNet liable for failing to take any action at all to impede infringement. But 
this would ignore the fact that no duty to act had been established. In this scenario, iiNet has 
no greater level of control than it did before. The reasonable steps consideration should not 
operate to preempt control.
If we view s. 101(1A) through the lens of tort law, however, it becomes clear the 
way in which paragraphs (a) and (c) relate to each other for omissions to act.59 Paragraph (a) 
sets up whether there is a duty to act to prevent infringement (a duty which depends heavily 
on control) and paragraph (c) considers whether that duty has been fulfilled (or breached) by 
examining the steps taken by the intermediary. Without a duty to act, there can be no breach 
for failing to act and thus no authorization.
Where it is claimed that one person should be legally responsible for the acts of an-
other, the duty of care of that person is intimately linked to the level of control he or she is 
able to exercise over the third party. Duty is dependent on control. Control, therefore, must 
be clearly defined – control over what or whom; control how. Power to prevent in copyright 
is not so specific. Power to prevent can be as straightforward as an on/off switch – techni-
cally, iiNet had a power to prevent infringement by terminating user accounts. The power to 
prevent inquiry is an exercise in ticking a box; it does not call for the same level of careful 
scrutiny as does the question of control. The iiNet High Court – even those judges who did 
not explicitly refer to tort principles – appeared to be more influenced by a tort conception 
of control than the copyright concept of power to prevent, 60 and in this sense they diverged 
from existing approaches to authorization liability. Under copyright, iiNet had a power to 
prevent infringement by terminating the accounts of infringing subscribers. Under a notion 
of control influenced by tort law, iiNet did not have a sufficient degree of control over the 
actions of subscribers for a duty to act to arise.61 iiNet had no control over the BitTorrent 
software or the copyrighted content shared by users over BitTorrent. It could not supervise 
the many subscribers’ uses of the BitTorrent software. It could warn, but that is not control. 
Or it could use its contractual power to terminate the subscribers’ accounts, which is a step 
ill-adapted to the problem. The iiNet case is a cogent example of the differences between 
control under tort and control under copyright, and the poorly defined scope of the latter. 
59. For consideration of paragraph (b), see Part VII.B. below.
60. See, for example, the exchange between Justice Kiefel and the counsel for the appellants during oral argu-
ments: “Kiefel J: But you have to say control over what. Control over their ability to --- Mr. Bannon: Infringe, 
yes. Kiefel J: Well, their ability to access the internet. Mr. Bannon: Yes, to access the internet. Kiefel J: That is 
rather a step removed from their ability to infringe which requires more.”: Roadshow Films Pty. Ltd. v iiNet 
Limited [2011] HCATrans 323 (30 November 2011).
61. This is not to say that an ISP will never be liable under a tort-influenced doctrine of authorization. Each 
case depends on its facts.
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This is interesting because a theory of control influenced by tort law could help to bring 
cohesion and clarity to the doctrine of authorisation liability in Australia.
VII. Other points to note
A. Causation
It is useful to include a brief note on causation. In negligence cases, the plaintiff 
must establish that the defendant’s breach of his or her duty caused the harm suffered by 
the plaintiff. Harrison Moore has argued that where the breach is an omission to act, it will 
be particularly difficult to show that the omission caused the harm.62 This was illustrated in 
the Modbury Triangle case, where both Chief Justice Gleeson and Justice Hayne expressed 
doubt as to whether illuminating the car park would have deterred the assailants.63 Chief 
Justice Gleeson noted that “facilitate” and “cause” are not the same thing – “[T]he appel-
lant’s omission to leave the lights on might have facilitated the crime, as did its decision to 
provide a car park, and the first respondent’s decision to park there. But it was not a cause of 
the first respondent’s injuries.”64 The same point can be made with respect to ISPs like iiNet: 
while the provision of internet access might have facilitated the infringements, it cannot be 
said to have caused the infringements. Further, it is not certain that sending warning notices 
would have deterred infringers or potential infringers.65 Something more would be required 
before liability would attach to an ISP in iiNet’s position.
B. Special relationship
For omissions to act, the general rule is that in the absence of a special relationship 
there is no duty to control one person to prevent the doing of damage to another.66 Tort law 
recognizes certain categories of special relationships where one person may be held respon-
sible for the conduct of another – these include parents and children,67 school authorities and 
62. Harrison Moore, Misfeasance and Non-feasance in the Liability of Public Authorities (part 2) 30 L.Q. Rev. 
415, 416 (1914).
63. Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty. Ltd. v Anzil (2000) 205 CLR 254, 263 (Gleeson CJ); id. at 290-291 
(Hayne J)(“The conduct of criminal assailants is not necessarily dictated by reason or prudential consider-
ations.”).
64. Id. at 269 (Gleeson CJ).
65. See Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd [2012] HCA 16 [138] (Gummow and Hayne JJ).
66. Id. 16 at [109]; Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Anzil (2000) 205 CLR 254, 264 (Gleeson CJ); id. 
at 270 (Gaudron J); id. at 292 (Hayne J); id. at 299-300 (Callinan J); Smith v Leurs (1945) 70 CLR 256, 261-262 
(Dixon J).
67. Smith v Leurs (1945) 70 CLR 256, 259 (Latham CJ); id. at 260 (Starke J); id. at 262 (Dixon J); McHale v Wat-
son (1964) 11 CLR 384; Cameron v Comm’r for Rys. [1964] Qd R 480.
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pupils,68 and prison wardens and prisoners.69 However, while courts may recognize a duty of 
care arising in particular fact circumstances, it is rare for new categories of “special rela-
tionships” to be established in tort.
It is unlikely that a special relationship would ever be shown to exist between copy-
right intermediaries (especially “passive” intermediaries) and their users, in the sense of a 
discrete category of relationship under tort. In copyright, the notion of special relationship, 
particularly in the context of s. 101(1A)(b) which directs courts to consider “the nature of 
any relationship existing between the person and the person who did the act concerned,” is 
best understood as a reference to the closeness of the relationship between the intermedi-
ary and the copyright infringer in so far as that helps to establish or deny a relationship of 
control.
C. Unresolved issues: the importance of foreseeability
The dissenting judge in Modbury Triangle, Justice Kirby, discussed at length the 
relevance of the appellant’s knowledge or foresight of the harmful actions of the third par-
ties.70 His Honor stated that the more notice that is provided, the greater the foresight and 
the more likely it is that the defendant will be liable for failing to respond.71 Justice Kirby 
also noted that knowledge, or reasonable foreseeability, was a dominant factor in similar US 
tort cases.72 This article has focused on control, because control has always been the more 
important element in authorization liability in Australia.73 However, knowledge was also 
a relevant element in the Moorhouse case, and featured in the iiNet case in relation to the 
adequacy of the AFACT notices. An interesting question is the extent to which an emphasis 
68. Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258; Geyer v Downs (1978) 138 CLR 91; Carmarthenshire 
County Council v Lewis [1955] AC 549.
69. Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. [1970] AC 1004; Ralph v Strutton [1969] Qd R 348; New South Wales v 
Godfrey (2004) Aust. Torts Reports ¶81-741. See also Modbury (2000) 205 CLR 254, 292 (Hayne J); cf. Howard v 
Jarvis (1958) 98 CLR 177; Hall v Whatmore [1961] VR 225.
70. Justice Kirby referred to evidence that the appellant was aware of the opening hours of the video store and 
that the respondent worked alone and was required to handle significant amounts of cash; that repeated com-
plaints had been made to the appellant about the lights being turned off too early, accompanied by requests that 
the lights be kept on until employees had left work; and that in the months preceding the attack, a car window 
had been smashed, two attempts had been made to break into the ATMs, and a nearby restaurant had been 
broken into. Modbury 205 CLR 254, 271-273, 286 (Kirby J).
71. Id. at 283-284. 
72. Id. at 277-278, referring to Lillie v. Thompson, 332 US 459 (1947); Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apart-
ment Corp, 439 F. 2d 477 (1970); McClung v Delta Square Ltd. P’ship, 937 SW 2d 891 (1996); Ann M v. Pac. 
Plaza Shopping Center, 863 P. 2d 207 (1993); Butler v Acme Markets, Inc. 445 A. 2d 1141 (1982); Nivens v 7-11 
Hoagy’s Corner, 943 P. 2d 286 (1997); Piggly Wiggly Southern, Inc. v. Snowden, 464 SE 2d 220 (1995); Holley v. 
Mt Zion Terrace Apartments, Inc., 382 So. 2d 98 (1980).
73. See Univ. of N.S.W v Moorhouse (1975) 6 ALR 193.
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on knowledge or foresight might impact upon findings of liability in some cases. This is part 
of a larger project on intermediary copyright liability and the subject of another paper.
Additionally, it should be noted that the analysis in this article is relevant to ISPs 
and similar “passive” intermediaries. It does not consider those intermediaries that deliber-
ately avoid control, like the defendants in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster.74 
Different considerations may (and probably should) apply for “bad actors”. This, too, is the 
subject of another paper.
VIII. Conclusion
In the internet age, copyright owners are increasingly looking to online intermedi-
aries to take steps to prevent copyright infringement. Sometimes these intermediaries are 
closely tied to the acts of infringement; sometimes – as in the case of ISPs – they are not. In 
2012, the Australian High Court decided the Roadshow Films v iiNet case, in which it held 
that an Australian ISP was not liable under copyright’s authorization doctrine which asks 
whether the intermediary has sanctioned, approved or countenanced the infringement. The 
Australian Copyright Act 1968 directs a court to consider, in these situations, whether the 
intermediary had the power to prevent the infringement and whether it took any reasonable 
steps to prevent or avoid the infringement. It is generally not difficult for a court to find the 
power to prevent infringement – power to prevent can include an unrefined technical abil-
ity to disconnect users from the copyright source, such as an ISP terminating users’ internet 
accounts. In the iiNet case, the High Court eschewed this broad approach in favor of focus-
ing on a notion of control which, I have argued, was strongly influenced by principles of tort 
law. This is an important shift in the Australian analysis of intermediary copyright liability, 
which has never given much emphasis to potential overlap with tort law. 
In tort, when a plaintiff asserts that a defendant should be liable for failing to act to 
prevent harm caused to the plaintiff by a third party, there is a heavy burden on the plaintiff 
to show that the defendant had a duty to act. The duty must be clear and specific, and will 
often hinge on the degree of control that the defendant was able to exercise over the third 
party. Control in these circumstances relates directly to control over the third party’s actions 
in inflicting the harm. Thus, in iiNet’s case, the control would need to be directed to the 
third party’s infringing use of BitTorrent; control over a person’s ability to access the inter-
net is too imprecise.
Further, when considering omissions to act, tort law differentiates between the abil-
ity to control and the ability to hinder. The ability to control may establish a duty to act, and 
the court will then look to small measures taken to prevent the harm to determine whether 
74. 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
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these satisfy the duty. But the ability to hinder will not suffice to establish liability in the 
absence of control.
Just as a tort plaintiff must show a breach of a duty in order to succeed in a neg-
ligence action, a copyright plaintiff should be able to point to a duty and breach before 
succeeding in an authorization claim against a “passive” intermediary like an ISP. This is 
appropriate because intermediary liability suits are not like other copyright infringement 
claims. Intermediary liability cases can have far-reaching ramifications for users who are 
not parties to the case but on whose allegedly infringing behavior the action is based. Where 
a court holds that an intermediary must take measures to terminate user accounts or to alter 
its products or services to impede infringement, then users who have not infringed copy-
right or who would otherwise have a viable defense to infringement may find their ability to 
access online services for communication, work and other facets of an internet-enabled life 
severely constrained. Plaintiffs should therefore be held to an appropriately high standard of 
proof, to counter the risks of harm to society that an uncertain and easy-to-establish inter-
mediary liability doctrine can pose. In Australia, there needs to be a more coherent frame-
work for determining the copyright liability of intermediaries, especially so-called “passive” 
intermediaries. Copyright’s current approaches are unclear and unpredictable, resulting in 
an ill-defined scope of liability. Concepts of duty and control informed by tort law may pro-
vide the additional benchmarks that copyright law currently lacks.
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